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BOOK REVIEW 
 
Peter Sloterdijk, Philosophical Temperaments: From Plato to Foucault, trans. Thomas Dun-
lap (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), ISBN: 978-0231153737 
 
Peter Sloterdijk’s Philosophical Temperaments accomplishes a surprising amount for such a small 
book. However, despite originating as a series of prefaces to 19 canonical philosophers, it should 
certainly not be confused with an introduction to philosophy. The essays themselves are quite 
short, usually around five pages, and demonstrate Derrida’s dictum that all prefaces, insofar as 
they are written after the text they introduce, are actually postfaces.1 To varying extents, Sloterdijk 
writes under the assumption that the reader is already familiar with a minimal outline of each 
author’s work but, for the most part, does not demand a deep understanding. For example, in 
order to understand most of the argument of the essay on Schopenhauer, it suffices to know that 
he was a pessimist who entertained an intellectual conversation with Buddhism. Other essays 
may be less accessible. However, doing away with the standard introductory details on the phi-
losophers gives Sloterdijk the space to explore unexpected dimensions of their work. Plato is jux-
taposed to shamanism, interpreting the intellectual access to the Forms as a rationalization of 
spiritual practices. The essay on Marx largely bypasses the philosopher himself in order to discuss 
the priority of interpretation. The choice of approach to each philosopher is itself as interesting an 
intellectual exercise as the content of the essays themselves. 
 For readers with the patience to weather the book’s rapid transitions and presumed 
knowledge, Philosophical Temperaments offers much as its own independent work of philosophy, 
and is recognizably a part of Sloterdijk’s broader projects. A helpful, albeit brief summary in 
Creston Davis’ salutary foreword helps to prepare the reader for the numerous references to 
Sloterdijk’s past works, but making the book fully accessible may require further readings or fa-
miliarity with Sloterdijk’s corpus. For example, Fichte turns out to be arguing that “you must 
change your life,” (46)2 while Kant must be arguing for an understanding of the human being as 
self-domesticating.3 Besides such direct references, the themes of cynical reason and sphereology 
                                                 
1 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 7. 
2 Peter Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life (Cambridge: Polity, 2014). 
3Peter Sloterdijk, “Rules for the Human Zoo: A Response to the Letter on Humanism,” Environment and Planning 
D: Society and Space 27, no. 1 (February 1, 2009): 12–28. 
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run throughout the text. In an essay echoing the “prologue” to Globes: Macrosphereology 4 , 
Sloterdijk’s Plato inaugurates philosophy as a form of education that welcomes the learner into a 
broader, richer cosmos organized around the center of “the True-Good-Beautiful” (9). Leibniz’s 
connections to the monarchist court evoke the image of a “Faustian science” (38) drawn directly 
from the Critique of Cynical Reason.5  
 Read as a straightforward contribution to Sloterdijk’s work, Philosophical Temperaments 
offers a form of guide to post-metaphysical thinking. From this perspective, the book contains 
two parts. From the essays on Plato to Hegel, Sloterdijk charts the rise and culmination of the 
grand metaphysical systems. Meaning, value, and understanding arouse out of a proper interpre-
tation of the subject’s place in a broader cosmic sphere. The essay on Schelling, which traces the 
transformation of his early work as an Idealist deducing principles of nature to his later work on 
“the finiteness and historicity of reason” (62) as an allegory of the “price of maturity” (63), serves 
as a bridge to the second part of the argument. From the essay on Schopenhauer to the final essay 
on Foucault, Sloterdijk offers a collection of possibilities for thinking in a world devoid of a cen-
tral, spherical intellectual form.  
The final essay dedicated to Foucault serves as a conclusion to the argument. Summarized 
as a practitioner of “Event philosophy” (99) who discarded the centrality of fixed notions of sub-
jectivity, theology, and cosmology in order to leave himself open “to the dizziness of the dissolu-
tion of boundaries and to the acuity of analysis” (97), Sloterdijk is able to cast Foucault as the 
culmination of the destruction of metaphysics. It is not a coincidence that Sloterdijk makes a thin-
ly veiled third-person reference to himself in the essay. Who else does he have in mind when he 
compares Foucault to “the neokynical6 aesthetic of the everyday” (96)? Sloterdijk’s Foucault is the 
paradigmatic post-metaphysical philosopher, one for whom thought takes place beyond the com-
forting confines of artificial “womb[s] for the grown-up unborns who sought to escape the cold-
ness of the modern outside world” (92). This theme of the importance of philosophy for (or as) a 
way of life, an intellectual shelter from the caprices of an irrational cosmos, remains a constant 
throughout Sloterdijk’s work, and this essay can be read as a summary of that trajectory. Howev-
er, readers of Foucault may be somewhat surprised to see him enlisted in support of such a holis-
tic project. While Sloterdijk pines for a return of a philosophy fit to serve such a grand, guiding 
role,7 Foucault maintained an enduring interest in cultivating a “limit-attitude” committed to de-
                                                 
4 Peter Sloterdijk, Globes: Macrosphérologie Sphères II, trans. Olivier Mannoni (Paris: Fayard/Pluriel, 2010), 11-38. 
5 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred, Theory and History of Literature 40 (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 175. 
6 “Kynical” is Sloterdijk’s term for the continuation of classical philosophical Cynicism, exemplified by Dioge-
nes, in contrast to the more colloquial meaning of the term “cynical”.  
7 Peter Sloterdijk, In the World Interior of Capital: Towards a Philosophical Theory of Globalization (Cambridge: Polity, 
2013), 3-14. 
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termining and experimenting with the boundaries of forms of knowledge, subjectivity, and pow-
er.8  
Conversely, Foucault, along with the other character sketches, provides Sloterdijk less with 
substantive arguments than with a cast of temperaments. From Hegel’s optimism in the con-
summation of the world in Spirit to Augustine’s relative misanthropy and disappointment about 
humanity’s divine fall, the essays present a series of affective responses to metaphysical and post-
metaphysical philosophy. At times, this facet of the text can come across as bizarrely vapid. For 
example, “Hegel’s typical times are therefore fall and evening; his preferred figure of thought is 
the deduction; his innermost color is gray, so closely associated with the night” (52-3). Just as this 
book is not genuinely an introduction to philosophy, it is also not a work of biography, although 
its argument that philosophy and biography intermingle and evoke each other places it some-
where between the two genres.  
This approach leads to the most exciting aspect of Philosophical Temperaments, namely its 
speculative task of reading dead philosophers as if they were contemporaries. What would it 
mean to be strategically anachronistic and read the history of philosophy as an antidote to the 
challenges of today? Even readers unconvinced by Sloterdijk’s judgement of contemporary prob-
lems may find something valuable in his method. By historicizing the philosophers in question, 
he investigates the differences that they introduced relative to their intellectual, political, or his-
torical context. In writing about Descartes, Sloterdijk challenges the reader to imagine “the epoch 
when what posterity liked to call the project of modernity was hardly more than a lively exchange 
of letters between a few dozen correspondents.” Can we read Descartes as if he was (still) a “New 
Philosopher” (27)? There is evidently something nostalgic about this approach, but not naively so. 
When Sloterdijk writes of Nietzsche, “He turned old texts into new tunes, and wrote new texts for 
old tunes” (81), one can easily interpret this line as a summary of the book as a whole. The new 
tunes may be recognizably Sloterdijk’s melody, but therein lies the strength of this book as an 
excellent entry point into Sloterdijk’s enormous body of work by way of an innovative retelling of 
philosophy’s history. 
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